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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL TAX
INJUNCTIONS-THE RICE MILLERS CASES
The Supreme Court in the recent Rice Millers Cases" has
brought to the fore an issue which for some years has been con-
sidered as fairly definitely settled, viz. the availability of an
injunction to enjoin the collection or assessment of a federal tax.2
The suit was instigated by eight rice millers against the de-
fendant, as Acting United States Collector of Internal Revenue,
for injunctions to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes
levied pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act., The Court
of Appeals of the fifth Circuit having refused the relief,4 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. In a brief opinion, delivered
by Mr. Justice Roberts, in which all the justices concurred, the
injunction was granted. No cases are cited as authority for the
court's decree: the court was satisfied to say that the exaction
was not a true tax.6 To understand satisfactorily the full signifi-
cance of this holding it is necessary to review briefly the legisla-
tive and judicial history of tax injunctions.
I.
Since 18687 there has existed upon the statute books of the
United States a statute which denied to taxpayers the right to
injunctive relief to enjoin the assessment or collection of taxes.
Many states have similar statutes.8 This statutory declaration is
1 Rickert Rice Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot; Dore v. same; United Rice Milling
Products v. same; Baton Rouge Rice Mill, Inc. v. same; Simon v. same;
Levy Rice Milling Co. v. same; Farmers Rice Milling, Inc. v. same; and
Noble-Trotter Rice Milling Co. v. same. (Jan. 13, 1936) 56 S. Ct. 374.
2 For a good discussion of this problem see Miller, "Restraining the Col-
lection of Federal Taxes." 71 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 318; (note) "Availability
of Injunction to Restrain Assessment or Collection of a Federal Tax," 18
ST. L. LAW REV. 311; Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) chap. 27, part III.
3 (1933) 48 Stat. 31; amended 1935, 49 Stat. 750; 7 U. S. C. A. sec 601
et seq.
4 Rickert Rice Milling Co. v. Fontenot (1935) 79 F. (2d) 700.
5 (1935) 56 S. Ct. 249.
6The A. A. A. law was declared unconstitutional a week prior in the case
of United States v. Butler et al (1936) 56 S. Ct. 312. See for discussion
note New Limitations on the Powers of Congress-The AAA Decision,
infra p. 149.
7 (1867) 14 Stat. 475. In 1875 the word "any" was added before the
word "tax." The present citation is R. S. sec. 3224; 26 U. S. C. A. sec.
1543. "No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
Simultaneously with this section was adopted one in which the procedure
to be followed in the recovery of illegal taxes is prescribed. R. S. sec. 3226.
For the latest revision see 26 U. S. C. A. see. 1672-1673. See infra note 70.8 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Distriot of Colum-
bia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, West Virginia. See cases cited in Cooley,
Taxation (4th ed. 1924) vol. 4, p. 3293.
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merely declaratory of the common law principle that courts
should be reluctant to enjoin the collection of taxes, because to
do so would be to interfere with the current governmental ac-
tivities.' The first expression of this principle by the Supreme
Court was in the case of Snyder v. Marks.0 Some thirty years
later " the Supreme Court took the opportunity of announcing
that this rule was not absolute, but, on the contrary, inapplicable
where circumstances exist which, in themselves, are proper sub-
jects of equity jurisprudence. This dictum was repeated in
Bailey v. George12 six years later. Then came what appeared to
be a milestone case. In Hill v. Wallace's an injunction was
granted against the collection of the taxes imposed upon the
Chicago Board of Trade by virtue of the Future Trading Act.
The imposition by the statute of heavy criminal penalties for
nonpayment of the tax and the high degree of public interest in
the plaintiff's business, were a combination of circumstances
deemed worthy of equitable relief, and sufficient to justify the
classification of this case within the "special and extraordinary"
circumstance qualification enunciated in Bailey v. George.14 Im-
mediately taxpayers began to contend that their cases were
"extraordinary and exceptional" and the Supreme Court was
called upon to indicate the possible limits of this exception. In
Dupont v. Graham" an injunction was refused although the
petitioner had no adequate remedy at law. In this case it was
established that by his own dilatory tactics the petitioner had
allowed the time to elapse which barred his administrative ap-
peal, and this fact the court held was sufficient reason for pre-
cluding equitable relief.16 More important, however, was the
court's statement that in the Wallace case it was not the collec-
tion of a tax but of a penalty, not coming within the prohibition
of the statute, which was enjoined.17 Then followed in 1932 the
9 Bailey v. George (1922) 259 U. S. 16; Miller v. Standard Nut Mar-
garine Co. (1932) 284 U. S. 498; Cheatham v. United States (1875) 92
U. S. 85, 89; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Dayton (1876) 11 Nev. 161; State R. R.
Tax Cases (1875) 92 U. S. 575, 614.
10 (1883) 109 U. S. 189. In this case an injunction was denied in a suit
brought to restrain the collection of a tobacco tax.
11 Dodge v. Osborne (1916) 240 U. S. 118.
12 (1922) 259 U. S. 116.
1 (1922) 259 U. S. 44.
14 Supra, note 10.
15 (1924) 262 U. S. 234.
16 Whereas this case is an example of the maxim, "Equity aids the
vigilant" the courts have also required "clean hands." Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Cooper (1919) 261 Fed. 635; Glos v. Stuckart (1917) 277 Ill.
346, 115 N. E. 536.
'7 Lipke v. Lederer (1922) 259 U. S. 557; Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell
(1922) 260 U. S. 386.
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"tribute to the tenacity of the American taxpayer"1 decision in
Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.19 In this case for the first
time the Court enjoined the collection of a tax because of the
"special and extraordinary" circumstances involved.l-,
In these injunction suits there has not been complete harmony
among the justices. In the Standard Nut case Justices Stone
and Brandeis dissented on the ground that a statute (R. S. sec.
3224) which is so explicit should not be judicially qualified,
whatever the equities involved; And in Lipke v. Lederer"° the
dissenting opinion of Justices Brandeis and Pitney expressed the
view that the mere designation of the levy as a "tax" should
conclude against injunctive relief restraining its collection so
long as there existed a means of recovering "taxes" illegally
taxed. The dissenters relied generally upon the opinion of Justice
Blatchford in Snyder v. Marks21 to the effect that the statutory
expression, "any tax", means a purported tax as well as a true
tax.
It is evident, therefore, that the statutory prohibition against
restraining the collection of taxes is often rendered inapplicable
to a particular case by extraordinary and exceptional circum-
stances. The cases granting relief have been limited to situations
where the taxpayer has no adequate remedy at law to recover
back the illegally assessed or collected taxes ;22 where there is
danger that a present adequate remedy will be removed ;23 and
where actions to recover back the taxes paid would necessitate a
multiplicity of suits.24 Additional circumstances may greatly
18 Gorovitz, "Federal Tax Injunctions and the Standard Nut Cases"
(1932) 10 Tax. Mag. 446.
19 (1932) 284 U. S. 498. In this case plaintiff's product had been de-
clared unassessable, but the collector subsequently assessed it and this suit
was brought to enjoin the collection. The company was financially unable
to pay the tax, and the assessment would have created a cloud. It is to be
noted that in Dodge v. Osborne, supra, the court refused to consider such
circumstances as exceptional.
1' See discussion by note 63, infra.
20 (1922) 259 U. S. 557.
21 Supra, note 10.
22 Pacific Express Co. v. Siebert (1890) 44 Fed. 310; Wallace v. Hines
(1920) 253 U. S. 66; Wilson v. Ill. So. Ry. (1923) 263 U. S. 574. So where
the statutory remedy is doubtful the remedy by injunction is available.
Brinkerhoff Farris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill (1930) 281 U. S. 673;
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton (1923) 262 U. S. 413; Fox v.
Standard Oil Co. (1935) 294 U. S. 87.
23 Gebelein, Inc. v. Milbourne (1935) 12 F. Supp. 105. See discussion by
note 46, infra.
24 Rowley v. Chicago, etc. Ry. (1934) 68 F. (2d) 527; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Trapp (1911) 186 Fed. 114; City v. Beckham (1902) 118 Fed.
399; (note) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 133. Contra, Rohlhemer v. Smietanka (1917)
239 Fed. 408.
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enhance the opportunities for injunctions, such as where the
assessment would constitute a cloud upon title ;25 where the tax
is a nullity and the property about to be seized is not liable for
the assessment ;26 and where the collector is selling the property
of a non-taxpayer to satisfy the demands made upon a taxpayer. 27
The statute does not, however, prevent the granting of an in-
junction to restrain the collection of a penalty28 nor the main-
taining by a stockholder of a suit to restrain a corporation from
voluntarily paying an alleged unconstitutional tax.29
In determining whether or not the taxpayer has an adequate
legal remedy the courts, as a rule, apply the standard that to
oust equitable relief the legal remedy must be plain and adequate;
as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt
administration as the equitable remedy.30 Such a remedy, the
courts have held, is provided where the aggrieved taxpayer is
permitted to sue to recover the tax, allegedly illegal, and the
validity of the assessment is tested in such an action.31 Where
this remedy is present it is held immaterial that the tax may be
unconstitutional, illegal, irregularily assessed, etc. There seems
to be some ground for questioning the adequacy of the remedy
25 Tilton v. Oregon, etc. R. (1874) 23 Fed. Cases 1289; California Land
Co. v. Gowen (1892) 48 Fed. 770; Shaffer v. Carter (1920) 252 Fed. 37;
McPike v. Pen (1872) 51 Mo. 63. All illegal tax assessments would not
create a cloud on title. For example, where the tax has no semblance of
legality, i. e., where the legality is patent no cloud is created. Hanner-
winkle v. Georgetown (1872) 15 Wall. (U. S.) 547. Where, however, the
illegality does not appear on the face of the record, but must be shown by
evidence courts of equity will consider the assessment as a cloud and grant
the appropriate relief. Dows v. Chicago (1870) 11 Wall (U. S.) 108.
26 Markle v. Kirkendall (1920) 267 Fed. 498; Thome v. Lynch (1921)
269 Fed. 995; Nichol v. Gaston (1922) 281 Fed. 67; Long v. Rasmussen
(1922) 281 Fed. 236; Brabham v. Cooper (1935) 9 F. Supp. 904.
27 Hubbard Inv. Co. v. Brast (1932) 59 F. (2d) 709; Livingston v. Becker
(1929) 40 F. (2d) 673.
28 Lipke v. Lederer (1922) 259 U. S. 557; Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell
(1922) 260 U. S. 386; Green v. Page (1935) 9 F. Supp. 844; Kansch v.
Moore (1920) 268 Fed. 669. But query, whether one seeking to enjoin the
collection of a penalty for nonpayment of a tax has, as is required of one
seeking equitable relief, done equity, not having paid or tendered the taxes
due. See Kohlhamer v. Smietanka (1917) 239 Fed. 408; Bank v. Kimball
(1880) 103 U. S. 732; Pelton v. Commercial, etc. Bank (1879) 101 U. S. 143.
29 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429; Brushaber
v. Union Pac. R. R. (1916) 240 U. S. 1.
30 The test is expressed generally in Boyce v. Grundy (1830) 2 Pet.
(U. S.) 210. As to its application in tax injunctions see Wallace v. Hines
(1920) 253 U. S. 66; Atchinson, etc. R. v. Sullivan (1909) 173 Fed. 456.
21 Emanus Silk Co. v. McCaughn (1925) 6 F. (2d) 660; Snyder v. Marks,
supra, note 10; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict (1912) 229 U. S.
481; Roebling v. Sturgess (1923) 292 Fed. 1012; Shelton v. Platt (1891)
139 U. S. 591; Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp (1934) 74 F. (2d) 200;
Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford (1930) 281 U. S. 121.
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at law where it merely permits the taxpayer to bring an action to
recover the tax back, for it is a well-known fact that the road
to the recovery of taxes is a slow and difficult one to travel:
clustered with technicalities and complications which often frus-
trate success by the taxpayer in cases of even unquestionable
merit.32 It has been held too, where the taxpayer is permitted to
maintain an action against the taxing official in trespass for the
taking and selling of the property to satisfy the tax,3 3 or where
the statute makes provision for having an assessment set aside
by appealing to a Board of Equalization, 4 that an adequate
remedy, sufficient to preclude equitable interference, is provided.
So too, where the collection of the disputed tax has been barred
by the Statute of Limitations no restraining order will issue, for
the remedy at law is plainly adequate. 35 There are, to be sure,
scattered cases which hold contra to the above enumerations, but
they may be classed as minority holdings without hesitation. One
authority36 has said, in reference to this field of jurisprudence
that ". . . upon no branch of the law of injunctions has there
been manifest greater apparent want of harmony in the decisions
of the court than that pertaining to the exercise of the juris-
diction in restraint of taxation."
II.
Immediately after the National Industrial Recovery Act was
declared unconstitutiona37 an avalanche of suits was filed by
millers and processors who sought to restrain the collection of
the taxes levied in pursuance of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act.38 The decisions rendered in these actions are irreconcilable.
A remarkable confusion and diversity of judicial interpretation
existed. The confusion has, however, favored the processors. In
the following paragraphs the writer will attempt to summarize
the judicial treatment afforded these units, which until the Rice
Millers Cases amounted to approximately 1900 in number, in-
82 Supra, note 18.
83 Metcalf Co. v. Martin (1907) 54 Fla. 531, 45 So. 463. But where he
is judgment proof it is otherwise. Richardson v. Scott (1872) 47 Minn. 236;
Beatie v. Brown (1872) 46 Ga. 458. But in Noll v. Morgan (1899) 82 Mo.
App. 112 it was held that an injunction will lie, solvency or insolvency of
the tax official being immaterial.
34Douglas County v. Stone (1903) 191 U. S. 557; Camp v. Simpson(1886) 118 Ill. 224, 8 N. E. 308; White v. Raymond (1900) 188 Ill. 298,
58 N. E. 976; Cole v. Forto (1913 Tex. Civ. App.) 155 S. W. 350.
5 Ellay v. Bowers (1928) 25 F. (2d) 637, cert. denied 277 U. S. 602;
Converse Cooperage & Yocono Co. v. Reinecke (1928) 26 F. (2d) 747;
Peerless Woolen Mills v. Rose (1928) 24 F. (2d) 576; Bashara v. Hopkins
(1924) 295 Fed. 319.
36 High (4th ed.) On Injunctions, sec. 484.
37 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S. (1935) 55 S. Ct. 837.
38 Supra, note 3.
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volved a sum of nearly $200,000,000, and resulted in the granting
of 1250 injunctions.8'
The vanguard of the influx was the case of Butler et al. v.
United States39 in which the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
First Circuit held the purported tax unconstitutional. Following
this pronouncement other lower federal courts considered that
this decision alone raised such doubts as to the validity of the
tax (and, of course, of the act in general) as to warrant the
issuance of temporary injunctions.40 Those courts which enjoined
the collection of the taxes based their decisions on the "extra-
ordinary circumstance" condition. The courts were willing to
accept the word of the processors that they were financially un-
able to pay the taxes. Financial ruin was the predominating
contention.
In a minority of cases the injunctions were denied.41 In these
cases the courts felt that sec. 21a,42 which is in substance a re-
enactment of R. S. 3224, denied relief by injunction. Those
courts which denied relief disposed of the "financial ruin" con-
tention by answering, logically, that it was no easier to pay the
tax into the registry than it was to pay the collector.4 24 In an
apparent effort to avoid direct conflict with the section denying
the injunctive relief, other processors and millers employed the
declaratory judgment procedure to test the validity of the entire
act." This type of relief was soon withdrawn, however, by an
amendment to the Act.44 The removal of this remedy, of course,
did not prevent injunctive relief.45
During the summer of 1935, with the majority of cases going
8 3 U. S. Law Week 431.
39 (1935) 78 F. (2d) 1.4°Inland Milling Co. v. Huston (1935) 11 F. Supp. 813; Gebelein v.
Milbourne (1935) 12 F. Supp. 105.
41 Cohen v. During (1935) 11 F. Supp. 824; Danahey Packing Co. v.
McGowan (1935) 11 F. Supp. 920; Larabee Flour Mills v. Nee (1935) 11
F. Supp. 132; La Croix v. U. S. (1935) 11 F. Supp. 817; Fisher Flouring
Mills v. Vierhus (1935) 12 F. Supp. 597.
42 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 623a "No suit ... shall be brought or maintained
in any court if such suit... is for the purpose or has the effect of prevent-
ing or restraining the assessment or collection of any tax imposed..."
42' Meridan Grain & Elevator Co. v. Fly (1935) 12 F. Supp. 64. Generally
when injunctions are granted it prevents further action, and as applied to
cases of this type would seem to mean that the taxes no longer had to be
paid. In the majority of these processing tax cases, however, the injunc-
tions were granted conditionally upon the taxes being paid into court pend-
ing a final determination by the Supreme Court.
43 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 400. Section 274 D, Judicial Code. See Vogt & Sons
v. Rothensis (1935) 11 F. Supp. 225; Black v. Little (1935) 8 F. Supp.
867; (note) Declaratory Judgments with Recent Missouri Developments 21
ST. L. LAW REV. 49, 1. c. 67 et seq.
" Sec. 405 Revenue Act of 1935. Adopted Aug. 30, 1935. See Meridan
Grain & Elevator Co. v. Fly (1935) 12 F. Supp. 64; Henrietta Mills v.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss2/8
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against the government, Congress began to consider other means
of thwarting relief to processors and millers. One bill under
consideration would have denied all rights of refund. The im-
minence of such legislation had alarming results. Courts at once
began to grant injunctions because of the threatening danger to
the only legal remedy. 46 Others took the view that anticipated
legislation was of no concern for the court.4 The amendment
finally adopted, however, was not so drastic, 8 and denied re-
covery of the taxes only where the processor was unable to show
that he had not passed the tax on to the vendee. Plaintiffs there-
upon challenged this provision as a virtual withdrawal of the
legal remedy because, it was claimed, it was impossible to de-
termine what portion of the tax was passed on and what portion
was not.49 Some courts refused to follow this contention and
took judicial notice of the fact that modern systems of account-
ing were such as to enable the requisite determination to be
made.50 The Supreme Court apparently has little faith in the
accuracy of modern accounting, for in the Rice Millers Cases
reference was made to the necessity of a "showing of facts not
suspectible of proof."sl
Upon the adoption of the amendments to the Act the Attorney
General ordered the District Attorneys to file motions to have
injunctions, where they had been granted, dissolved. This pro-
cedure was successful in only forty instances, for generally the
courts did not consider the adoption of the amendments sufficient
reason for dissolving the injunctions.52 In fact in the Ninth
Circuit injunctions were refused before the amendments53 but
granted after.5 4 Whereas a few courts refused injunctions after
Hooey (1935) 12 F. S-upp. 61. See also sec. 21a (2) of A. A. A. act, as
amended. 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 623a (2).45 Inland Milling Co. v. Huston, supra, note 40; Gebelein v. Milbourne,
supra, note 40.4r.Washburn Crosby Co. v. Nee (1935) 11 F. Supp. 822; Neild Mfg. Corp.
v. Hasset (1935) 11 F. Supp. 642; Gebelein v. Milbourne, supra, note 40;
Gold Medal Foods, Inc. v. Landry (1935) 11 F. Supp. 65.
47 Merkle, Inc. v. Rasquin (1935) 12 F. Supp. 215; La Croix v. U. S.(1935) 11 F. Supp. 817; Lake Erie Provisions Co. v. Moore (1935) 11 F.
Supp. 522.48 Sec. 21d; 7 U. S. C. A. 623d (1).
49 Inthe hearing before the Supreme Court in the instant case Chief
Justice Hughes ask the attorney for the processors, "So you contend that
sec. 21d, as amended, is virtually a withdrawal of the government's consent
to be sued?" These words epitomize the basis of the processors claim to a
right to injunction to prevent the collection of the tax.50 Rieder v. Rogan (1935) 12 F. Supp. 307.
51 56 S. Ct. 374 at 375.
523 U. S. Law Week 45.
53 Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Vierhus (1935) 78 F. (2d) 889.54 Luer Packing Co. v. Rogan (1935) 79 F. (2d) 1.
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the adoption of the amendments, 5 the majority continued to
grant them. 6 The line of cleavage seems to have remained largely
unchanged.
On January 13, 1936 the Supreme Court decision was rendered
which put a halt to the conflicting holdings of the lower courts.
On the next day the Attorney General ordered the collection of
the A.A.A. taxes stopped. 57 Processors lost no time in applying
for releases of funds impounded by injunctions, which were as
readily granted.58 On January 22 the Federal Court in St. Louis
released impounded taxes in a number of suits.59 Attempted
interventions by butchers, grocers, etc., who claimed to be en-
titled to the tax money, since they had paid it to the plaintiffs,
have not been successful2 ° In defense of these rulings it is to be
interposed that to permit interventions would mean ultimately to
permit consumers to intervene-a practical impossibility.
There still remains for determination the question of the effect
of the invalidity of the taxes on processors seeking refunds by
the procedure provided by sec. 21d, as amended.6 1 The question
was noted by the Supreme Court, but its decision made a deter-
mination unnecessary. In the refund suits that will undoubtedly
follow in the wake of the Rice Millers decision, the court will,
in all probability, be called upon to determine the validity of this
procedure, as limiting the prior statutory right of a taxpayer to
recover taxes illegally exacted regardless of their incidence.
III.
Since the case of Snyder v. Marks62 the doctrine has been con-
sistently accepted that an injunction will not lie to enjoin the
55 Rieder v. Rogan, supra, note 50; Hentietta Mills v. Hooey (1935) 12 F.
Supp. 61; Jones v. Viley (1935) 12 F. Supp. 476; Louisville Provisions Co.
v. Glenn (1935) 12 F. Supp. 545; Frye & Co. v. Vierhus (1935) 12 F. Supp.
597.
56 Grosvenor Dale Co. v. Bitgood (1935) 12 F. Supp. 416; Gold Medal
Foods v. Landry (1935) 12 F. Supp. 406; Larabee Flour Mills v. Nee
(1935) 12 F. Supp. 395; Danahy Packing v. McGowan (1935) 12 F. Supp.
457; Inland Milling Co. v. Huston (1935) 12 F. Supp. 554; Baltic Mills Co.
v. Bitgood (1935) 12 F. Supp. 132; A. P. W. Paper Co. v. Riley (1935)
12 F. Supp. 738; Kingan & Co. v. Smith (1935) 12 F. Supp. 328; Shenan-
doah Milling Co. v. Early (1935) 3 U. S. Law Week 119; Regensburg &
Sons v. Higgins (C. C. A. 2) Oct. 29, 1935. 3 U. S. Law Week 197.
51 Comptroller's Decision No. A-69783.
58 Perry Mill & Elevator Co. v. Jones (D. C., W. D. Old.) Jan. 25, 1936,
3 U. S. Law Week 455. Larabee Flour Mills v. Nee (C. C. A. 8) 3 U. S.
Law Week 517.
59 Imbs Milling Co. v. Sheehan, Suit no. 11591; Saxony Mills v. Sheehan,
suit no. 11517.
60 Acme Evans & Co. v. Smith (D. C., S. D. Ind., Jan. 22, 1936) 3 U. S.
Law Week 496. See also St. Louis Daily Record for Jan. 23, 1936. Also
Washburn v. Nee (0. C. W. 0., Mo.) 3 U. S. Law Week 563.
61 See discussion by note 48.
62 Supra, note 10.
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assessment of collection of a federal tax on the mere ground of
unconstitutionality.6 3 In the instant case, it is to be noted, the
court completely ignored the necessity of equitable circumstances
if such in fact were present.
The present situation must be juxtaposed with that which
existed fourteen years ago. In 1922 the Supreme Court refused
to grant an injunction restraining the collection of a tax 4 which
on the same day was declared unconstitutional., Despite the
denial of the injunction no attempt was ever made to collect the
tax, for the obvious reason that, it having been declared uncon-
stitutional, the collector had no colorable right to demand pay-
ment. In the present instance the invalidity of the tax was
declared a week prior.6 It was easy for the Supreme Court to
say then: the plaintiff has not paid, we have already said that
it was not a true tax, therefore he -cannot be made to pay. Al-
though this seems to be the true distinction between the instant
case and Bailey v. George67 there is some room to justify the be-
lief that since the opinion does not distinguish the two cases,
that the rule of law enunciated by the latter case (as distin-
guished from its practical result) is now overruled by inference. 8
While the result of the decision has been severely criticized
by some,69 it remains for consideration whether in general the
maxim of "Pay first, litigate later" has, any longer, any value.
This requirement was admittedly harsh on the taxpayer and
resulted in much harassment. Nor does it appear that the govern-
ment gained by the procedure. It simply required double work:
of collecting and then refunding, with the result the same as if
the taxes had never been collected. The old rule was predicated
upon the theory that courts should not interfere with the govern-
ment's revenue which, presumably, was necessary for current
63 Shelton v. Platt (1891) 139 U. S. 591; Bailey v. George (1922) 259
U. S. 16; Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp (1934) 74 F. (2d) 200.
64Bailey v. George, (1922) 259 U. S. 16.
65 Child Labor Cases (1922) 259 U. S. 20.
66 Supra, note 6.
67 (1922) 259 U. S. 16.
68 The government in their motion for a rehearing in .the Rice Millers
Cases, supra, note 1, stressed the point that the lower federal courts would
probably interpret the decision to mean that Bailey v. George was over-
ruled.
89 Senator Norris refered to this decision as "the greatest gift since God
made salvation free." Congressional Record vol. 30, p. 1925; Secretary of
Agriculture Wallace denounced the result of the decision in a radio address
on Jan. 28, 1936 (N. B. C.'s National Farm & Home Hour Program) as a
"legalized steal." He added that it was inconsistent for the Supreme Court
to say on one Monday that it is unconstitutional to collect from all groups
(the consumers) to pay to one group (the farmers) and to say the next
Monday that it is constitutional to repay the money taken from all groups
(the consumers) and give it to one group (the processors).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
governmental activities. Such a condition no longer exists. The
government's immediate credit is unlimited: sounder than that
of any business. The government can well afford to delay the
collection of a tax until its constitutionality has been judicially
declared.
One step in the direction of disgarding the restrictions sur-
rounding tax refunds which have co-existed with the statutory
denial of injunctive relief, and which are based upon similar con-
siderations, is the abandonment of the requirement that a tax
be paid under protest if the taxpayer is ever to recover it back.
This change has been effected by an Act of Congress applicable
to internal revenue taxes generally.70
Time alone will reveal the effect and scope of the instant deci-
sion. It is noteworthy, however, that the meaning of an appar-
ently succinct and unambiguous statutory expression is, after a
judicial battle of 69 years, still in doubt.
WALTER FR=DMAN '37.
NEW LIMITATIONS ON THE POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE A. A. A. DECISION
The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of United
States v. Butler' held the Agricultural Adjustment Act2 uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that: a) it did not in reality provide
for a tax but for an exaction which was regulatory and b) the
expenditures in the act were made in such a way as to amount
to regulation of matters in which the sole regulatory powers
were reserved to the states.
The case arose in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Massachusetts under the title of Franklin Process
Co. v. Hoosac Mills Corporation.4 The receivers for the Hoosac
Mills Corporation presented a report recommending that a claim
of the United States for $81,694.28 representing accrued process-
ing taxes and flour taxes assessed pursuant to sections 9 and 16
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act' be dismissed. The District
Court refused to adopt the report and held that the claim should
be allowed. On appeal to the United States Circuit Court for the
70 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1672-1673. Subsection (3) "Such suit or proceeding
may be maintained whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress." This provision was adopted June 6, 1932. 47
Stat. 286.1 (1936) 80 Law. Ed. Adv. Op. 287.
2 May 12, 1933, Chap. 25, 48 Stat. at L. 31, U. S. C. A. Tit 7 see. 601.
3 Supra, note 1.
4 (1934) 8 F. Supp. 552.
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